Individer har rettigheter under SP «åleine»

Det er alltid interessant når tidigere høyesterettsdommere tilkjennegir sitt syn på grunnleggende rettsspørsmål. Selv om jeg ikke har vært involvert i debatten omkring Fosen-saken kunne jeg derfor ikke dy meg fra å skumlese Karl Arne Utgårds kritikk av den på Rett24. Allerede da hevet jeg mer enn ett øyenbryn av Utgårds argumentasjon i punkt 2.1.

Argumentasjonen der oppsummeres greit av Utgårds grunnleggende påstand om at FN-konvensjonen om sivile og politiske rettigheter (SP) «berre gir rettighetar til statspartane». Dette er er en såpass klar feilslutning at jeg i mitt stille sinn antok at Utgård hadde formulert seg sleivete.

Når professor emeritus Geir Ulfstein deretter på kort, men pedagogisk vis i sitt svarinnlegg på Rett24 forklarte hvordan SP gir individer rettigheter, antok jeg at Utgårds eventuelle tilsvar ville utdype hva han egentlig mente å si.

Så feil kan man ta. For, i sitt tilsvar til Ulfstein gjentar Utgård at individer ikke har rettigheter under SP «åleine». Ifølge Utgård er individrettigheter under SP betinget av om staten individet ønsker å gjøre krav gjeldende mot er part til den første tilleggsprotokollen til SP (TP1).

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Koronabortvisning av EØS-borgere og unionsborgerdirektivet artikkel 29(2)

I løpet av de siste ukene har det dukket opp saker i media om at EØS-borgere, som i månedsvis eller årevis har jobbet eller studert i Norge, blir bortvist på grensa etter en kort utenlandstur. NRK har for eksempel rapportert om ei som har oppholdt seg i Norge siden 2019, og som reiste en kort tur til hjemlandet Polen for å delta i morens begravelse. Da hun returnerte til Norge etter et par dager ble hun bortvist på grensa – hun slapp altså ikke inn i landet, hvor hun leier leilighet sammen med sin kjæreste. Et par dager senere kunne VG fortelle om bortvisningen av en 18-åring som snart har fullført 2 år på videregående i Norge, og som returnerte til Norge etter et besøk hos familien i Østerrike. Alt tyder på at det er snakk om hundrevis, om ikke tusenvis av bortvisninger av denne typen. Dagens oppslag i Aftenposten, som jeg har bidratt til, føyer seg inn i dette mønsteret.

Min umiddelbare ryggmargsrefleks da jeg så de første oppslagene var at dette måtte være i strid med unionsborgerdirektivet, som er en del av EØS-avtalen:

Samtidig tenkte jeg at dette var så åpenbart problematisk at de fleste jurister måtte forstå dette – i alle fall de som jobber med rettsområdet i relevante departementer. Derfor antok jeg at relevante regler og/eller praksis ville bli korrigert umiddelbart etter at sakene ble kjent for disse gjennom medieoppslagene.

Så feil kan man ta. Siden det ikke skjedde noe som helst på en ukes tid sendte jeg Rett24.no noen kulepunkter om hvorfor disse bortvisningene var i strid med unionsborgerdirektivet artikkel 29. Dette resulterte i et oppslag på Rett24 den 28. april. Fortsatt skjedde det ingenting. Nå, over en uke senere, har Justisdepartementet fortsatt ikke gitt Rett24 noe svar på de spørsmålene de har stilt. Justisdepartementet har faktisk ikke en gang sagt “ingen kommentar”. De har unnlatt å svare overhodet. Det er, som jeg påpeker i fredagens Rett24-oppslag, rett og slett feigt.

Heldigvis er Norge fortsatt en rettsstat, og vi får håpe at domstolene rydder opp. Samtidig er inntrykket mitt etter de siste par ukene at få av advokatene som er involvert er kjent med unionsborgerdirektivet. Det er dessuten et mer generelt informasjonsbehov, særlig når ansvarlige myndigheter nekter å stille opp til intervjuer og debatter.

Dette blogginnlegget er et forsøk på å fylle dette behovet. Her skal jeg gjøre nærmere rede for hvorfor det er i strid med unionsborgerdirektivet å bortvise disse personene. Etter min mening er det opplagt at bestemmelsen i unionsborgerdirektivet artikkel 29(2) må tolkes slik at den innebærer et absolutt forbud mot å bortvise personer som (1) har oppholdt seg i Norge i over tre måneder mens de har arbeidet, studert, eller lignende, og (2) deretter reiser en kort tur utenlands.

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Some progress during the 7th meeting of the 47+1 group

A couple of months ago, the negotiations on the EU’s accession to the ECHR resumed, with what was termed the sixth meeting of the 47+1 group – the ad hoc negotiation group involving all 47 Council of Europe and the EU. From 24–26 November, the 47+1 group held their 7th meeting, and the last of 2020. Some progress was made, but from reading the report it is becoming increasingly clear that no immediate breakthroughs are in sight.

In this post I will, using publicly available sources (primarily the meeting report), briefly summarize and take stock of the progress made. I begin by listing the issues that were not dealt with at all during the 7th meeting, and then turn to the issues there were the subject of negotiations at the 7th meeting. Finally, I will say a couple of words about other business at the 7th meeting, notably the exchange of views with representatives of civil society.

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The negotiations on the EU’s accession to the ECHR have resumed

From 29 September to 1 October 2020 the so-called 47+1 Group, which consists of representatives of all Council of Europe Member States and the European Union, held their first formal negotiation meeting on the EU’s accession to the ECHR since the 2013 Draft Accession Agreement (DAA) was rejected by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Opinion 2/13. When it was handed down back in December 2014, I characterized Opinion 2/13 as a “direct and unequivocal attack on the accession agreement” by the CJEU. In the same post, I also predicted that it would be “very difficult to satisfy the CJEU’s objections by way of amending the accession [instruments]”.

The fact that it has taken almost six years for the negotiations to properly restart is a testament to these difficulties. At the same time, the resumption of the accession negotiations signals that the parties indeed believe that it is possible to satisfy or circumvent the CJEU’s objections in Opinion 2/13 – or, perhaps, that some of the objections no longer hold water.

The meeting report from the first renegotiation meeting – or the sixth negotiating meeting in CoE parlance, continuing the numbering from the previous round – has just been made available on the CoE website for the accession negotiations. Another key document is the “Paper by the Chair to steer the discussion at the 6th meeting of the CDDH ad hoc group (47+1)“, which was drafted to structure the negotiations. Finally, the EU Commission’s negotiating mandate – a heavily guarded document in the first round of negotiations – was leaked almost simultaneously with its approval in October 2019.

In this blog post, I analyze the meeting report, in light of the Chair’s paper, and take stock of the progress made so far.

A glimpse of the 6th 47+1 negotiation meeting
(Photo credit: Council of Europe)
Continue reading “The negotiations on the EU’s accession to the ECHR have resumed” →

Human Rights Accountability of CSDP Missions on Migration

(Originally published on the EU Migration and Asylum Law and Policy blog.)

Interested in the accountability of IOs? Read my book!
Interested in the accountability
of IOs? Read my book!

Respect for human rights and the rule of law are among the European Union’s foundational values proclaimed in TEU article 2. The Lisbon treaty’s merging of the EU’s three pillars, together with the elevation of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights to the level of primary law, ensured a sufficient level of substantive human rights protection across all the Union’s activities. However, the right to an effective remedy – enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter , as well as in regional and global human rights treaties – requires available and effective procedural mechanisms for holding human rights violators to account. When it comes to the availability and functioning of such mechanisms, which I will refer to as accountability mechanisms, there is less uniformity and significant gaps.

These gaps are increasingly becoming visible in the area of immigration and asylum, where the powers of the Union and its agencies have been rapidly expanding over the last few years, in response to the so-called “migration crisis” of 2015. In a post on this blog written back in April, Melanie Fink highlighted the lack of access to human rights accountability mechanisms in relation to Frontex.

The EU response also included the establishment of a military Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) mission, Operation Sophia, to combat human smuggling and trafficking. At the outset, Operation Sophia consisted of one aircraft carrier, supported by six ships and two submarines, and additional units were deployed in subsequent phases. With a mandate that allowed for the “boarding, search, seizure and diversion” of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling and trafficking, not much imagination is needed to see that there are risks of human rights violations.

Union responsibility for CSDP missions

CSDP missions form part of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the Lisbon Treaty merged the former three pillars into one Union, the CFSP remains a markedly intergovernmental part of an increasingly supranational Union. Still, acts under the CFSP heading remain Union acts. Horizontal rules of EU law – such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights – therefore also apply to the CFSP, and thus to CSDP missions. Since the Union does not have its own military forces, CSDP missions are made up by contingents of units provided by the Member States. These units are put under the joint command of an Operations Commander. Up the chain of command from the Operations Commander, we find first the Council’s Political and Security Committee, and at the very top the Council itself.

From a legal perspective there are two key challenges for establishing that the Union is responsible, as a matter of substantive law, for human rights violations by CSDP missions:

  • First, whether the conduct that is alleged to represent a human rights violation is attributable to the Union.
  • Second, whether the conduct attributable to the Union constitutes a violation of a provision of its human rights law obligations.

The issue of attribution is particularly problematic with regard to CSDP missions, such as NAVFOR Operation Sophia. While the Operations Commander of the mission exercises what is in military parlance known as “operational command and control”, the Member States retain a certain degree of control over their troops. At the very least they retain the right to withdraw them at any time, as well as disciplinary jurisdiction. But contributing Member States often insist on, and are granted, even further “caveats” – for example the right to refuse to carry out individual orders from the Operations Commander. Untangling exactly which actor is responsible for a particular act or omission – the Union or/and (one or more) of its Member States – can therefore be very difficult. Yet, there are situations where the conduct of participating military contingents could be attributable to the Union, and the Union will also often share responsibility with (one or more) of its Member States through its complicity.

The second issue, establishing whether a course of conduct attributable to the Union constitutes a violation of its human rights obligations, is comparatively easier. The Charter of Fundamental Rights contains a modern catalog of human rights provisions that are also applicable to the conduct of CSDP missions. In contrast to most other international organizations, the Union in other words offers a high level of human rights protection as a matter of substantive law.

Accountability mechanisms

The question then is whether the high level of substantive human rights protection is matched by sufficient accountability mechanisms. It is particularly when answering this question that we see how the CFSP – and thus CSDP missions – is “subject to specific rules and procedures” (TEU article 24, emphasis added).

Since the object is the accountability of the Union as such – and not that of its Member States – the first obvious potential mechanism is the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, while the CJEU’s now has a general jurisdiction to “ensure […] that the law is observed”, it follows from TFEU article 275 that it “shall not have jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy nor with respect to acts adopted on the basis of those provisions”. There are some exceptions to this CFSP carve-out, notably that the Court is competent to monitor compliance with TEU article 40 and to review “restrictive measures against natural or legal persons”. But none of these exceptions  are applicable to CSDP missions. Indeed, the operational conduct of CSDP missions is at the very core of the CFSP. If the carve-out provision is to have any meaning, the CJEU must therefore lack jurisdiction over such operational conduct. Individual victims consequently lack access to the CJEU.

A second potential accountability mechanism at the Union level is the European Ombudsman. Its jurisdiction ratione materiae in principle covers the entirety of the Union’s activities – including those of CSDP missions. Its jurisdiction ratione personae also seems broad, as it extends to complaints from all EU citizens and residents. However, note that this in practice excludes all those who are likely to be victims of human rights violations by CSDP missions: non-EU citizens that do not have their residence in the EU. This is particularly true in cases where CSDP missions are used to enforce migration policy, as was the case with Operation Sophia.

Interestingly, though, the lack of jurisdiction ratione personae does not render the Ombudsman completely ineffective. That is because in addition to receiving complaints, the Ombudsman can also open own-initiative inquiries. The Ombudsman has used this tool to circumvent the restrictions on its complaints-based jurisdiction. In cases where it has been considered appropriate, the Ombudsman has formally dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction ratione personae and then immediately opened an own-initiative inquiry into the same facts. The European Ombudsman thus functions, indirectly and informally, as an accountability mechanism for CSDP missions.

Access is not alone enough to render the Ombudsman a sufficient accountability mechanism, though. Even when it acts as an accountability mechanism, the aggrieved individuals are not given party status, since the procedure is formally that of an own-initiative inquiry. Moreover, the findings of the Ombudsman are not binding. Although the Ombudsman as had a strong track-record in getting Union bodies and agencies to comply – even in CFSP matters – an unbinding decision is not fully compliant with the right to an effective remedy.

A third option for aggrieved individuals seeking to hold the Union to account is to sue it in domestic courts. While domestic lawsuits against international organisations are usually a hopeless endeavor due to the jurisdictional immunity, that is not the case when it comes to Union-led CSDP missions. That is because TFEU article 274 provides that, for cases falling outside the scope of the CJEU’s jurisdiction, “disputes to which the Union is a party shall not […] be excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals of the Member States”. As mentioned above, the CJEU lacks jurisdiction in cases where CSDP missions are alleged to have caused human rights violations. However, even if the Union does not have jurisdictional immunity in these cases, further obstacles in practice render domestic courts ineffective as accountability mechanisms. As the pre-Brexit judgment by the UK High Court of Justice in the case of Tomanović et al. v. the European Union et al.  illustrates, domestic courts tend to be weary of deciding cases involving international organisations. Moreover, even if all procedural hurdles are surmounted, the outcomes of domestic proceedings are only binding as a matter of domestic law in one Member State, and they are in practice unenforceable since the Union has immunity against the enforcement of judgments against it. With the Union thus in principle being free to ignore their judgments, recourse to the domestic courts of EU Member States cannot be regarded as a sufficiently effective accountability mechanism.

In addition to these general accountability mechanisms, some CSDP missions have established mission-specific accountability mechanisms. For those missions that have Status of Forces Agreements (meaning agreements with third states on the status of the mission, jurisdiction, immunities, etc.), an ad hoc claims procedure is usually established by the agreement. The procedure typically consists of negotiations, followed by assessment by a claims commission composed of representatives of the mission and the host state, and finally, if there is still no agreement, arbitration proceedings. However, various procedural limitations render them ineffective as human rights accountability mechanisms. Moreover, some missions, such as Operation Sophia, operate without any Status of Forces Agreements.

Another, and exceptional, example is the Human Rights Review Panel established to hold EULEX Kosovo to account. This is, to my knowledge, the only intentionally established human rights accountability mechanism with jurisdiction over a CSDP mission. While there is much good to say about the Human Rights Review Panel and its case-law, its main weakness is that it lacks the power to issue legally binding decisions. Thus, even the Human Rights Review Panel fails to fulfill all the requirements flowing from the right to an  effective remedy.

As this brief survey reveals, the human rights accountability of CSDP missions is lacking. The right to an effective remedy is not respected. Potential accountability mechanisms are either unavailable or offer insufficient outcomes.

Potential solutions

Reform of the accountability mechanisms applicable to CSDP missions is therefore needed. Such reform should happen by establishing mechanisms at the Union (or international) level because domestic courts are unable to provide an effective remedy, for the reasons explained above.

A potential first step towards reform could be to replicate EULEX Kosovo’s Human Rights Review Panel in other CSDP missions. While this will not by itself ensure sufficient human rights accountability, it is a step that can be taken easily, without e.g. amending the constituent treaties of the Union. Potential further steps could include expanding the jurisdiction of the CJEU, and the accession of the Union to the European Convention on Human Rights.

Finally, one has to highlight the potential that lies in the existing accountability mechanisms. Very few have taken advantage of the European Ombudsman’s extensive jurisdiction, and there is only one known example of a domestic court case against the Union involving the conduct of a CSDP mission, namely the above-mentioned case of Tomanovic et.al. v. The European Union. While these accountability mechanisms are by no means perfect, they do appear to be under-utilised. Hopefully, both this post and my book will make lawyers more aware of them and their potential.

New book: “The Human Rights Accountability Mechanisms of International Organizations”

Book cover.

This summer I published a book, The Human Rights Accountability Mechanisms of International Organizations, which based on my PhD thesis with Cambridge University Press.

The book is available through the Cambridge University Press store, in both hardback and eBook formats. It is also available to institutional subscribers via Cambridge Core.

A few days ago I also posted a summary of the book at the Cambridge University Press blog fifteeneightyfour, which is reproduced below:

Are international organizations accountable towards individuals when they violate human rights?

International organizations are becoming increasingly powerful. In recent decades states have steadily been conferring powers upon international organizations in order to solve transnational problems and to provide global public goods. As a corollary of their increasing powers, international organizations affect the lives of individuals across the globe – directly and indirectly – through their decisions and conduct. Consequently, they are also more capable of violating the human rights of individuals.

Legal scholars have reacted to these developments by studying whether and to what extent international organizations are responsible for human rights violations. The studies published so far have generally found that international organizations do have human rights obligations, that they sometimes do act in contravention of such obligations, and that when they do, international organizations are responsible as a matter of substantive international law towards individuals.

But accountability is more than responsibility. A power-wielder is accountable when there are procedural mechanisms available to hold it to account. My book, entitled The Human Rights Accountability Mechanisms of International Organizations, takes the debate on the accountability of international organizations one step further by analyzing and assessing the accountability mechanisms of international organizations. The book offers three main contributions:

  • A general framework for identifying, analyzing, and assessing the accountability mechanisms of international organizations.
  • Three case studies of the accountability mechanisms applicable in situations where international organizations wield significant power vis-à-vis individuals.
  • A sketch of the way towards reform that will ensure accountability.

The first contribution – a general framework for identifying, analyzing, and assessing the accountability of international organizations – is perhaps the most interesting for researchers. In the book, I develop a definition of international organization accountability mechanisms, as well as a detailed taxonomy of them.

I also propose a normative framework for assessing the sufficiency of such accountability mechanisms. This framework is built upon legal theory on the right to remedy, and both legal theory and social psychology research on procedural justice. On the basis of these theoretical approaches, I establish a concrete set of normative yardsticks against which to assess the accountability mechanisms of international organizations. These yardsticks are bundled in four groups, reflecting to the aspects of accountability mechanisms that they may be used to assess: access, voice, neutrality, and outcome.

While the scope of the book is limited to human rights accountability mechanisms, this framework for analysis and assessment is general. It can be used to analyze and assess the legal accountability mechanisms applicable to any international organization. Hopefully, other researchers will find this framework useful when engaging in case studies of the accountability mechanisms of (other) international organizations.

Second, my book contains three in-depth case studies of the human rights accountability mechanisms applicable to situations where international organizations wield significant power vis-à-vis individuals:

  • Detention in the International Criminal Court’s Detention Centre.
  • The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy Missions.
  • Refugee camp administration by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In each case study, I apply the above-mentioned framework to identify, analyze, and assess the relevant accountability mechanisms. Each case study chapter begins with an introduction of the organization, how it exercises power over individuals in the situation in question, and what the organization’s human rights obligations are. Then the applicable accountability mechanisms are identified, analyzed and assessed in light of the normative yardsticks; access, voice, neutrality, and outcome.

Third, I end the book with an overview of the tendencies and paradoxes observed, a discussion of their generalizability and implications, and finally a sketch of the direction a reform agenda should take. Specifically, I suggest that to enhance accountability by curtailing the jurisdictional immunity of international organizations is neither desirable, nor easier to achieve than the alternatives. I instead advocate reform at the international level, by establishing new accountability mechanisms with jurisdiction over international organizations.

Lynanalyse: sak E-4/19 Campbell mot Norge

I forbindelse med undervisningen i EØS-rett har både jeg og studentene bidratt med analyser av den prinsipielle og helt ferske rådgivende uttalelsen fra EFTA-domstolen i sak E-4/19 Campbell mot Norge [2020] i et lukket diskusjonsforum på UiOs læringsplattform Canvas. Når jeg først hadde skrevet en lengre “lynanalyse” av dommen tenkte jeg det var dumt å la den bli liggende innelåst på diskusjonsforumet. Derfor deler jeg analysen her på bloggen også.

Jeg kaller denne analysen for en “lynanalyse”, siden den er en nedskriving av mine umiddelbare tanker når fra lesingen av EFTA-domstolens rågivende uttalelse i Campbell. Den har med andre ord blitt til i stor fart, med den følge at risikoen for feil og mangler er stor. Likevel håper jeg noen har nytte av analysen.

Sakens faktum ser jeg ikke noe behov for å skrive et sammendrag av, siden EFTA-domstolen i avsnittene 19–24 oppsummerer det sentrale faktumet på en effektiv måte:

“19  Ms Campbell, a Canadian national, has been married to Ms Gjengaar, a Norwegian national, since June 2012. […]

20  […] in December 2012, the couple moved to Sweden, where Ms Gjengaar registered with the local authorities and entered into a lease for a flat in Mörsil, approximately 200 kilometres from Trondheim, Norway. Ms Gjengaar applied for work unsuccessfully in Sweden until 21 February 2013, a period of approximately seven weeks. On 21 February 2013, Ms Gjengaar began working aboard the Hurtigruten coastal ships in Norway in shifts of three weeks aboard and three weeks off. During her time off, Ms Gjengaar travelled back to Sweden, but she also occasionally stayed in Trondheim, and from time to time took holidays in other countries. Ms Gjengaar left her job on the ship on 10 September 2013.

21  In January 2014, Ms Gjengaar formally registered as having moved back to Norway. From March 2014, Ms Gjengaar returned to work aboard the Hurtigruten coastal ships. […]

22  Ms Gjengaar has never had permanent employment aboard the Hurtigruten coastal ships, but has worked in accordance with fixed-term contracts, which she completed.

23  On 5 June 2014, Ms Campbell applied for a right of residence in Norway as a family member of an EEA national. She stated that she had lived with Ms Gjengaar in Sweden from December 2012 until January 2014.

24  The Directorate of Immigration refused the application on 23 September 2014 […]


Spørsmålene fra Høyesterett og hvordan EFTA-domstolen forholder seg til dem

De innledende bemerkningene fra EFTA-domstolen i avsnitt 42–46 bør dere lese litt nøye. Der får man et komprimert sammendrag av prosedyrene rundt foreleggelsessaker.

Høyesterett hadde, kort fortalt, stilt EFTA-domstolen tre spørsmål:

  1. Gjelder unionsborgerdirektivet artikkel 7(1)(b) jf. (2) analogisk for retursituasjon (mao: stemmer virkelig det EFTA-domstolen sa i Jabbi?)
  2. Hvordan skal vilkåret om at oppholdet i vertsstaten må ha “sammenhengende varighet” på minst tre måneder forstås? Kan det være avbrudd, f.eks. i forbindelse med jobb i hjemlandet?
  3. Hvordan skal vilkåret om at familielivet må være “reelt, slik at det ble lagt til rette for et familieliv i vertsstaten” forstås?

For en som har lest faktum og Høyesteretts spørsmål kan det virke som det mangler noe her, nemlig et spørsmål om reglene om fri bevegelighet for arbeidskraft kan gi en avledet rett til opphold. Kona til Campbell jobbet nemlig på Hurtigruta mens de bodde i Sverige. Hvis hun da ble forhindret fra å ta med seg Campbell hjem til Norge når hun flyttet tilbake dit, ville jo det være en restriksjon på hennes frie bevegelighet som arbeidstaker – det har EU-domstolen lagt til grunn i en rekke saker.

Det er prosessuelle grunner til at Høyesterett ikke stilte det spørsmålet. Campbell hadde ikke anført EØS-avtalen artikkel 28 for lagmannsretten, bare unionsborgerdirektivet. Heller ikke i anken til Høyesterett var EØS-avtalen artikkel 28 anført. Først etter at saken slapp inn til behandling for Høyesterett ba Campbells advokat om å få supplere argumentasjonen med EØS-avtalen artikkel 28. Det sa Høyesterett nei til i starten av april 2019:

“Spørsmålet om den ankende parts ektefelle er arbeidstaker etter EØS-avtalen artikkel 28, beror på et annet faktisk grunnlag enn det som er avgjørende ved vurderingen under direktiv 2004/38/EF artikkel 7. Utvalget er på den bakgrunn enig med ankemotparten i at det er tale om et nytt påstandsgrunnlag som krever samtykke etter tvisteloven § 30-7. Påstandsgrunnlaget vil etter utvalgets syn endre sakens karakter og vidløftiggjøre den. Det er videre relativt kort tid til ankeforhandlingen. Tillatelse blir derfor ikke gitt.”

Det hører med til historien at den muntlige ankeforhandlingen ble holdt i slutten av april 2019, og først etter det ble det besluttet å sende spørsmål til EFTA-domstolen. Når svarene på disse spørsmålene nå har kommet er planen å ha en ny muntlig høring med Høyesterett i storkammer.

EFTA-domstolen er naturlig nok ikke bundet av norske prosessregler. Men i hvor stor grad må EFTA-domstolen holde seg innenfor rammen av de spørsmål en nasjonal domstol har stilt? Dette redegjør EFTA-domstolen for i avsnittene 44–45 i Campbell. Det er ikke noe nytt her, men dommen er et godt eksempel på noe som skjer fra tid til annen: at spørsmålene en nasjonal domstol har stilt redefineres eller suppleres for å gi den nasjonale domstolen de EØS-rettslige elementene som den kan trenge for å avgjøre saken:

“it is incumbent on the Court to give as complete and as useful a reply as possible and it does not preclude the Court from providing the national court with all the elements of interpretation of EEA law which may be of assistance in adjudicating the case before it, whether or not reference is made thereto in the question referred” (avsnitt 45)

I neste avsnitt (46) slår EFTA-domstolen bare kort fast at den finner det nødvendig å også vurdere EØS-avtalen artikkel 28 (fri bevegelighet av arbeidskraft), selv om det ikke er reist spørsmål om dette.

Det blir interessant å se hva Høyesterett gjør nå (hvis ikke partene forliker saken). Hadde jeg vært Campbells advokat hadde jeg på ny forsøkt å supplere argumentasjonen med EØS-avtalen artikkel 28, og bedt Høyesterett om samtykke til det. Nå vil man ha bedre tid enn bare et tre-fire uker før muntlig høring, slik at kontradiksjonsproblemene ikke er så akutte, og EFTA-domstolens drøftelse av artikkel 28 vil nok gjøre det ubehagelig for Høyesterett å foreta en ny avskjæring.


EFTA-domstolens drøftelse etter reglene om fri bevegelighet av arbeidskraft, jf. EØS-avtalen artikkel 28

Tolkningen av EØS-avtalen artikkel 28 i Campbell ser ikke ut til å være nyskapende. Hele veien bygger EFTA-domstolen på veletablert rettspraksis fra EU-domstolen.

I avsnitt 49 minner EFTA-domstolen oss på at begrepet “arbeidstager” skal tolkes utvidende, og de klassiske kriteriene gjengis: “for a certain period of time a worker performs services for and under the direction of an employer in return for remuneration”. Domstolen legger også til at deltidsarbeidere er omfattet av begrepet.

Videre legger domstolen til at det foreligger et grenseoverskridende element når en EØS-borger flytter til et annet EØS-land, men jobber i hjemstaten (avsnitt 50). Det er nettopp dette som var situasjonen for kona til Campbell: hun var norsk, men bodde i Sverige samtidig som hun jobbet i Norge.

EFTA-domstolen påpeker også at når en EØS-borger har benyttet seg av retten til fri bevegelighet senere flytter tilbake til hjemstaten, vil det være en restriksjon om EØS-borgere ikke får ha med seg sin ektefelle. Forutsetningen for dette er at EØS-borgeren har bosatt seg genuing i den andre staten, og har etablert eller styrket et familieforhold der.  Med mindre denne restriksjonen lar seg rettferdiggjøre, må ektefellen få en avledet oppholdsrett sammen med EØS-borgere i sistnevntes hjemstat (avsnitt 51).

Avslutningsvis kommer EFTA-domstolen inn på arbeidsfordelingen mellom den og nasjonale domstoler:

“Whether, having regard to the facts of the case, Ms Gjengaar should be considered a worker as a matter of EEA law is for the referring court to determine. It is also for the referring court to decide whether family life was created or strengthened through genuine and continuous residence in the host State, by taking into account all relevant circumstances. ” (avsnitt 52).

Likevel klarer ikke EFTA-domstolen helt å dy seg fra å si noe om subsumsjonen. I neste setning skriver domstolen nemlig: “considering the information in the referring court’s request, it would appear that Ms Gjengaar is to be considered to be a worker pursuant to Article 28 EEA” (min uthevelse). Som vi ser er altså Campbell et eksempel på en avgjørelse der EFTA-domstolen også berører subsumsjonen, selv om det strengt tatt ikke er domstolens oppgave i en rådgivende uttalelse, jf. ODA-avtalen artikkel 34.


EFTA-domstolens drøftelse etter unionsborgerdirektivet artikkel 7(1)(b) jf. (2)

EFTA-domstolen velger å dele behandlingen av direktivet i to deler, ved å slå sammen de to siste av de tre spørsmålene Høyesterett stilte.

Det første spørsmålet EFTA-domstolen drøfter er om resultatet fra Jabbi-saken kan opprettholdes: at unionsborgerdirektivet artikkel 7(1)(b) jf. (2) kan anvendes analogisk når EØS-borgere returnerer til sitt hjemland med en tredjelandsborger. Dette spørsmålet er omstridt fordi EU-domstolen gjentatte ganger har uttalt at direktivet ikke kan tolkes analogisk, og at slike saker derfor må løses etter TEUV artikkel 21 (unionsborgerskapet). EØS-avtalen har ingen traktatbestemmelse som tilsvarer TEUV artikkel 21.

EFTA-domstolen ser kort og godt ingen grunn til å endre standpunktet som den inntok i Jabbi:

“Recent case law of the ECJ referred to in the Supreme Court of Norway’s request has upheld relevant findings of the judgment in O. and B. However, none of these judgments concern the interpretation of the Directive in the context of the EEA Agreement. The Court finds that the EEA legal context remains unaltered since Jabbi, and accordingly, as firmly supported by ESA and the Commission, the Court finds no reason to depart from the understanding of homogeneity and effectiveness as expressed in that judgment.” (avsnitt 58)

Om man leser bare dette avsnittet virker det som om EFTA-domstolen i Campbell opprettholder Jabbi fullt og helt. Men, om man leser domstolens begrunnelse nøye, er det kanskje mulig å se en viss nyansering. Som Gjermund Mathisen, director of competition and state aid i ESA, gjorde meg oppmerksom på via Twitter, opphører bruken av ordet “analogy” etter avsnitt 55. EFTA-domstolens egen begrunnelse for å opprettholde Jabbi er altså kjemisk fri for dette omstridte ordet.

Det EFTA-domstolen derimot skriver i sin konklusjon i avsnitt 59 er at unionsborgerdirektivet artikkel 7(1)(b) jf. (2) gjelder for (“are applicable to“) personer som Campbell. Også begrunnelsen soim leder frem til dette, særlig i avsnitt 57, fremhever hele tiden at det er snakk om en tolkning (“interpretation”). En tolkning er, metodisk sett, noe litt annet enn en analogi. Med andre ord kan det kanskje sies at EFTA-domstolen i Campbell bekrefter resultatet i Jabbi, men med noe mer overbevisende begrunnelse. Som folkerettsjurist blir jeg i alle fall mer overbevist av å lese en begrunnelse som bygger på en anerkjent kilde (traktat) som staten er bundet av. En analogislutning (som det EFTA-domstolen hevdet var det den gjorde i Jabbi) innebærer å etablere nye plikter for statene ved siden av eksisterende traktatforpliktelser – og det er vanskelig å akseptere.

Det andre EFTA-domstolen drøfter er Høyesteretts spørsmål nr. 2 og 3: hva er et “sammenhengende” og “genuint” opphold, og hva er forholdet mellom disse vilkårene og den generelle læren om misbruk av rettigheter? Også dette drøftes med løpende henvisninger til, og så vidt jeg kan se i full overenstemmelse med, EU-domstolens rettspraksis. På noen punkter er det ingen rettspraksis fra EU-domstolen, og EFTA-domstolen må derfor drøfte noen underspørsmål på et mer selvstendig vis.

EFTA-domstolen gir Norge rett i at ikke ethvert opphold i en annen EØS-stat, sammen med et familiemedlem, gir opphav til avledede rettigheter (avsanitt 62). Når det er sagt, vil et sammenhengende og genuint opphold i en vertsstat gå hånd i hånd med, og fungere som bevis for, at familieliv er etablert og/eller styrket i vertsstaten (avsnit 63).

I sin tolkning av begrepet “reelt” (“genuine”) / “sammenhengende” (continous) opphold (residence) peker EFTA-domstolen først på direktivets formål, som argument for at direktivets regler om oppholdsrett må tolkes utvidende for å sikre deres effektivitet. Følgelig kan det i følge EFTA-domstolen ikke være et krav til konstant fysisk tilstedeværelse i vertsstaten (avsnitt 65). Denne konklusjonen støtter EFTA-domstolen deretter opp med noen kontekstuelle tolkningsargumenter i avsnitt 66.

Antagelig i et forsøk på å operasjonalisere dette i lys av sakens faktum skriver EFTA-domstolen videre i avsnitt 67:

“Therefore, “residence” must be interpreted as allowing reasonable periods of absence which may or may not be work-related, and which as to their duration do not contravene and are not inconsistent with a genuine residence.”

Heller ikke her klarer EFTA-domstolen å dy seg fra å subsumere. I avsnitt 68 går domstolen langt i å konkludere med at kona til Campbell sine arbeidsperioden på Hurtigruta i Norge utgjør slike “reasonable periods of absence”.

Når det gjelder forholdet mellom direktivets regler om den generelle EØS-rettslig læren om misbruk av rettigheter, slår EFTA-domstolen fast at restriksjoner på rettigheter etter unionsborgerdirektivet bare kan gjøres i samsvar med direktivets artikkel 27 og 35 (avsnitt 69). Jeg synes det er vanskelig å lese dette annerledes enn at EFTA-domstolen utelukker at den generelle misbrukslæren kan brukes ved siden av direktivets regler. Når det er sagt, så er unionsborgerdirektivets artikkel 35 formulert nærmest som en henvisning til den generelle misbrukslæren med en liten presisering om at proformaekteskap skal anses som misbruk.

Misbrukslæren er riktignok neppe aktuell i Campbell, siden staten ikke en gang har anført den i prosessen for EFTA-domstolen (avsnitt 72).

New publication: “Dual Attribution of Conduct to both an International Organisation and a Member State”

Just in time for the holidays, my article on dual attribution was published in the Oslo Law Review today. Here is the abstract:

Responsibility, and in particular attribution of conduct, is one of the most intensely debated issues of public international law in the last couple of decades. In this article I seek to determine whether, how, and when acts or omissions may be attributed both to an international organisation and a member State (dual attribution). My aim is to clarify what dual attribution is, and what it is not. This is done in two steps. First, I (a) define the concept of dual attribution, (b) demonstrate that dual attribution is possible under the current law of international responsibility, and (c) establish a typology of dual attribution. Second, dual attribution is distinguished from three forms of shared responsibility. These are situations of two acts or omissions leading to one injury, derived responsibility, and the notion of piercing the corporate veil of international organisation. I end the article by criticising the disproportionate attention given to dual attribution in legal scholarship, given its limited practical utility.

Click here to access the full text on Idunn.no (open access).

I hope the article (or at least its illustrations!) can be useful for teaching purposes. Since OsLaw is an open access journal, you are free to share it widely, and also to e.g. re-use the illustrations in presentations under the terms of the CC-BY license.

oslaw-2019-3-1-1

New publication: “Suing the European Union in the UK: Tomanović et. al. v. the European Union et. al.”

ep_ej_2016_2_coverI have just published a piece in European Papers that critically analyzes the very interesting Tomanović judgment of the England and Wales High Court (Queen’s Bench Division).

Here is the abstract:

In its judgment of 13 February 2019 in the case of Tomanović et. al. v. the European Union et. al., the English High Court of Justice dismissed several claims based on human rights violations by EULEX Kosovo. Although the High Court’s dismissal was ultimately based on the lacking incorporation of the Treaty provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy into domestic law, the judgment contains extensive obiter dicta discussing key Union law matters. In this Insight I summarize, contextualize and reflect critically upon the High Court’s reasoning. In particular, I focus on the extent of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over – and the application of the Foto-Frost principle to – the CFSP.

Click here to access the full text on EuropeanPapers.eu (open access).

It’s been a while…

… since the last time I updated this blog. Much has happened in both my personal and professional life over the last 2 years: I’ve finished my PhD, got a Senior Lecturship at the UiO, and last (but definitely not least) a daughter. Additionally, I have published a few smaller things that I forgot to post about here:

Currently I am working on publishing my PhD thesis, entitled The Human Rights Accountability Mechanisms of International Organizations: A Framework and Three Case Studies. While you await its publication, you can enjoy this little teaser of an abstract:

International organizations are becoming increasingly powerful. As a consequence, they are now more capable than ever of violating the human rights of individuals. But how can international organizations be held to account for such violations? This thesis assesses the procedural mechanisms that may hold international organizations to account. First, a general framework for identifying, analyzing and assessing the accountability mechanisms of international organizations is established. Second, the general framework is applied to three distinct cases: the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy missions, Refugee camp administration by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Detention by the International Criminal Court. The thesis concludes that in none of the three case studies do the existing accountability mechanisms fulfill the normative requirements set out in the general framework. However, there are significant variations between the cases, and between different types of accountability mechanisms. In light of these findings, the thesis puts forward some hypotheses applicable to international organizations generally.